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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 52 JANUARY, 1954 No. 3 
FEDERAL CONTROL OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STAND-
ARDS IN PEACETIME PRIVATE ATOMIC ENERGY 
ACTIVITIES 
Samuel D. Estep* 
The Problem 
IN June and July of 1953 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress of the United States conducted extended public 
hearings1 on the question of whether it was not now time to open up 
for private industrial development the field of atomic energy heretofore 
operated as a virtual government monopoly, under the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946.2 Since that time the Atomic Energy Commission has 
announced that it is preparing to construct a full-scale reactor for the 
express purpose of producing electrical energy as a contribution to the 
peacetime utilization of atomic energy.3 In addition, Representative 
W. Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Committee, has suggested that 
there are already needs for electrical energy of a kind which would 
justify and perhaps best be met by relatively high-cost atomic reactor 
generating plants.4 The Joint Committee's serious interest in the possi-
bility of recommending that the field be opened to private industry is 
further indicated by their request to the American Bar Association to 
make recommendations as to the changes required in the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946 to make it possible for private industry to enter the field. 
The American Bar Association announced on November 20, 1953, 
that the requested recommendations had been submitted to the Joint 
Committee and that the special committee making the report believed 
that private capital should be allowed and even encouraged to enter 
the field.6 
""Associate Professor of Law, University of Michlgan.-Ed. 
1 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United 
States, 83d Cong., 1st sess., on "Atomic Power Development and Private Enterprise," June 
24, 25 and 29; July 1, 6, 9, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 27 and 31 (1953). 
2 60 Stat. L. 755, 42 U.S.C. (1946) §1801. 
SN.Y. T1MEs, October 23, 1953, p. 1:8. 
4 N.Y. TIMEs, October 30, 1953, p. 25C: 1 
6 N.Y. TIMEs, November 21, 1953, p. 4C:2. 
334 MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw [ Vol. 52 
These expressions of official interest indicate that serious considera-
tion will be given during this second session of the 83d Congress to 
the question of making possible, through changes in the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946, a peacetime privately :financed atomic energy industry. 
Before making such changes, however, Congress will undoubtedly 
consider the impact the changes would have on the regulation of the 
somewhat peculiar health and safety problems incident to atomic energy 
operations. Under the present act t:pe Atomic Energy Commission not 
only has achieved a remarkable safety record in government operations 
through stringent health and safety standards but has also controlled 
the standards which are used by persons licensed to obtain and use 
:fissionable material and radioactive isotopes for private purposes, such 
as research. Congress may feel that control of health and safety stand-
ards should remain in federal hands in view of the present development 
of the art and because federal personnel, as compared with most state 
agencies, have considerably greater knowledge of these problems. At 
least the Joint Committee has been concerned about the constitutional 
justi:6cation for continued federal health and safety controls if the 
present government monopoly should be relinquished. 6 It seems ap-
propriate, therefore, to consider the question of whether or not Congress 
would have the constitutional power to regulate health and safety con-
ditions if private industry were allowed to operate in something like a 
normal way in the atomic energy :field. 
This article is directed to the question of the power of Congress to 
provide for such regulation of those who handle radioactive materials 
in private industry and not to the policy question of whether Congress 
ought to attempt such regulation. 
Preliminary Considerations 
The argument usually made against federal power to control such 
things as health and safety conditions is that such matters traditionally 
have been the concern of the states and the Constitution left such 
matters to the states. Typically the Tenth Amendment is cited in 
support of this position. This amendment reads: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
6 The Joint Committee requested the American Bar Association Committee to give an 
opinion on the constitutional question and I was asked by that special committee to prepare 
a memorandum on the question. This article is based upon the memorandum submitted 
to the A.B.A. Committee and forwarded by it to the Joint Committee. I am indebted to 
David L. Howe, legislative analyst with the Legislative Research Center of the University 
of Michigan Law School for assistance in preparing the memorandum. He is not, however, 
to be held responsible for the views here expressed. 
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it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." 
In analyzing the power of Congress, therefore, it becomes important 
to keep in mind the attitude of the present Supreme Court toward the 
Tenth Amendment. At one time, it is true, the Supreme Court placed 
considerable dependence upon the Tenth Amendment in deciding 
whether Congress had the power to act in areas that might at first blush 
seem to be left to the states.7 However, in such cases as United States 
11. Darby,8 decided in 1941, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
it considers the Tenth Amendment as nothing but a truism. Instead of 
asking, "Is this regulation of an area reserved to the states?" the present 
Court always asks, 'What is the extent of Congress' power over com-
merce, or bankruptcy, or disposal of government property, etc.?" There-
fore, in considering whether Congress would have the power to regu-
late health and safety conditions in peacetime private atomic energy 
operations it is essential that the question be approached from the stand-
point of whether there is any possible power of Congress under which 
the action can be justified constitutionally, rather than with the query, 
"Does this fall in an area which has traditionally been left to the states?" 
One further observation of considerable significance should be 
made concerning the general attitude of the Supreme Court toward 
congressional power. Since the invalidation of the first Agricultural 
Adjustment Act and the Bituminous Coal Act in 1936° the Supreme 
Court has not once invalidated an act of Congress on the ground that 
Congress did not have sufficient power under the Constitution to regu-
late some activity, though Congress has often painted with a broad 
brush during these past seventeen years. Congressional acts have been 
invalidated on other grounds but not because the kind of activity regu-
lated was beyond the power of Congress to control.1° Neither does the 
7 E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449 (1922); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton 
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 758 (1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 
S.Ct. 312 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936). 
s 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941). 
o United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 312 (1936), and Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855 (1936). Ashton v. Cameron Co. Water Improve-
ment District No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892 (1936), holding invalid the application 
of compulsory bankruptcy provisions in the Federal Bankruptcy Act to political subdivision 
of a state should perhaps be added, but the reason for invalidity is distinguishable from 
that used in the Butler and Carter Coal cases, since it is not based on the 10th Amendment 
argument. 
l0E.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943), invalidating a 
presumption of evidence provision in the Federal Firearms Act as a violation of the due 
process clause of the 5th Amendment; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 
1073 (1946), holding invalid, as a bill of attainder, a congressional act providing that no 
compensation should be paid to designated individuals. In addition in several recent cases 
the Court has worked hard to interpret a statute so as to avoid serious constitutional ques-
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denial of inherent powers to the President in the Steel Seizure case11 
suggest limitations on Congress' power. While striking down the Presi-
dent's exercise of power there, the Court made it quite clear that 
Congress could have done the same thing denied to the President. 
While the practical significance of this seventeen-year trend is obvious 
some might well argue that it has no logical or theoretical relevance to 
our question of congressional power. Actually, it is submitted that this 
failure to invalidate a single law of Congress for lack of power is indic-
ative of the Court's acceptance of a quite tenable, and certainly ex-
tremely significant constitutional principle concerning the relationship 
between the judicial and legislative branches of the federal government 
-that, except when some specific prohibition of the Constitution is 
found, such as the ex post facto clause, the Court should be extremely 
reluctant to substitute its own ideas of what is a proper exercise of 
power for that made by the politically representative body, Congress. 
In considering the federal wagering or gamblers' tax act the majority 
of the Court, in United States 11. Kahriger,1 2 upheld the tax largely 
upon the basis. of this very philosophy. They first quoted from Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch 11. Maryland: 
" ... But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calcu-
lated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to 
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would 
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, 
and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pre-
tensions to such a power."13 
The majority then went on in their own· words: 
''Where federal legislation has rested on other congressional 
powers [than the tax power], such as the Necessary and Proper 
Clause or the Commerce Clause, this Court has generally sus-
tained the statutes, despite their effect on matters ordinarily 
considered state concern. When federal power to regulate is 
found, its exercise is a matter for Congress .... 
"A reason was that 'the judicial cannot prescribe to the legis-
lative departments of the government limitations upon the exer-
cise of its acknowledged powers.' "14 
tions. See, e.g., United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948); United 
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 73 S.Ct. 543 (1953). There is also a suggestion of a 
constitutional justification for the interpretation given in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). 
11 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952). 
12 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510 (1953). 
13 Id. at 29, quoting from 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 423 (1819). 
14 Id. at 29, 31. 
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One further preliminary consideration should be mentioned. As 
yet there is relatively very little experience in peacetime industrial use 
of atomic energy. Therefore, before a constitutional analysis of con-
gressional power can be made, some assumptions must be accepted as 
to the likely character and extent of peacetime uses should Congress 
open the door to private utilization. This article has been prepared on 
the basis of several such assumptions. One is that Congress might 
desire to regulate health and safety standards for all uses of radioactive 
material. Another is that, at least at the beginning of peaceful use of 
atomic energy (other than the use of radioactive isotopes as at present), 
the primary emphasis will be on the generation of electric power from 
atomic reactors for distribution by the typical electric utility, solely 
within the boundaries of a single state. However, it is also assumed 
that, with this production of electric power, it is very likely that mar-
ketable by-product materials will be produced also and that they will 
be sold in interstate as well as intrastate commerce. Even the present 
stage of technological development makes these assumptions reasonable 
and it certainly is fair to assume that the use of radioactive isotopes is 
going to expand greatly. 
On these assumptions there will be problems of health and safety 
regulations for the use and handling of radioactive isotopes (such as 
are now being used by industry) of fissionable material (such as is now 
being used privately only for research) and of radioactive waste mate-
rials (incident mostly to operation of atomic reactors). While the 
handling and use of each of these materials presents its own peculiar 
safety problems (though waste materials are actually in one sense only 
a form of radioactive isotopes) no distinctions are made for purposes 
of this analysis of congressional power because the necessity for proper 
health and safety control is in each case dependent on the same assump-
tions that the problems of health and safety in atomic energy are some-
what peculiar and that the knowledge of these problems is still largely 
restricted to the federal government and those who have participated 
with the government in the present atomic energy program. 
Specific Congressional Powers 
This article suggests five powers specifically or impliedly given to 
Congress by the Constitution which might be used to justify control 
of health and safety conditions. As to each the leading cases are con-
sidered and the manner in which the power might be used to achieve 
the desired control is indicated, all on the assumption that Congress 
would want to exercise the greatest possible control so as to point up 
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the constitutional problems most sharply. Since our concern is with 
control of private peacetime operations no consideration is given to the 
power of Congress to control the working conditions to be followed 
by private companies supplying materials to the federal government 
under government contract. In any event this power is clear under 
the ~es upholding the Public Contracts Act.15 
The analysis of these :five powers is almost necessarily broken down 
into :five parts. However, there is nothing to prevent Congress from 
justifying its regulations upon more than one of these listed powers. 
In any event, it undoubtedly would be wise for Congress to make 
careful fact :findings as to the necessity for health and safety regulations, 
possibly to write such reasons into a preamble to any act, and to phrase 
the regulations in terms of the power given to it under the specific 
clauses suggested. 
1. Power to Dispose of Property Owned by the Government. 
Article 4, section 3, paragraph 2 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property be-
longing to the United States . . ." In United States v. Gratiot, de-
cided in 1840, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the United 
States, in disposing of lead found on government property, to license 
the right to mine the lead and to impose conditions upon the leasehold 
which the lessee did not like and attempted to break, rather than be 
forced to sell it outright as argued by the lessee. The Court said that 
this power to dispose of property "is vested in congress without limita-
tion . ... "16 In 1918 the Supreme Court decided Ruddy v. Rossi. 
The Court there held that the provisions of the Homestead Act, 
limiting the right of prior creditors to seize homestead property, were 
constitutional and stated that these lands "may be leased, sold or given 
away upon such terms and conditions as the public interests require."17 
In 1935 the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.18 This case involved the right 
of the United States, through the TV A program, to dispose of surplus 
electrical energy generated at the Wilson Dam. The dam had been 
built under the war power during World War I. The Court held that 
15 49 Stat. L. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. (1946) §35. In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 
310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940), the Court held that suppliers who objected to wages 
set by the Secretary of Labor had no legally protected right invaded and so had no standing 
to complain. 
1614 Pet. (39 U.S.) 526 at 537 (1840). Emphasis added. 
11248 U.S. 104 at 106, 39 S.Ct. 46 (1918). 
1s 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936). 
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this surplus power could be sold even though the amount generated 
was far in excess of the amount reasonably needed to operate the 
navigation locks and B.ood gates at the darn. The Court said that the 
darn created usable power and the government could dispose of that 
power as it saw fit. The Court also held that TV A could buy the 
necessary transmission lines and real property necessary to dispose of 
the energy generated at the darn. At page 338 of the opinion, the 
Court said "the Government could lease or sell and fix the terms." 
In United States v. City and County of San Francisco,19 decided 
in 1939, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Raker Act of 1913.20 This act had granted to the 
city and county of San Francisco certain lands and rights of way in the 
public domain in Yosemite National Park and an adjoining national 
forest to supply water for domestic purposes and to establish a system 
for the generation and sale of electrical energy. By the terms of the 
grant the city was prohibited from selling or letting property to any 
private corporation or individual. The Secretary of Interior was al-
lowed to enjoin the arrangement made by the city of San Francisco 
to distribute its power through a private company. The Court said: 
"Thus, Congress may constitutionally limit the disposition of 
the public domain to a manner consistent with its views of public 
policy. And the policy to govern disposal of rights to develop 
hydroelectric power in such public lands may, if Congress chooses, 
be one designed to avoid monopoly and to bring about a wide-
spread distribution of benefits. The statutory requirement that 
Hetch-Hetchy power be publicly distributed does not represent 
an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State but 
instead only an exercise of the complete power which Congress 
has over particular public property entrusted to it."21 
Certainly, at the beginning of private utilization of atomic energy 
for the production of electric power it looks as if the private concerns 
will have to obtain fissionable material from the AEC. Radioactive 
isotopes are already being distributed by the AEC for non-military 
purposes. In the light of the above cases it seems obvious that Congress 
has the constitutional right to authorize the AEC to require that, as · 
a condition to the purchase or lease of such material, certain health 
and safety standards be followed by the purchaser or lessee. 
However, it is certainly contemplated that once private reactors 
19 310 U.S. 16, 60 S.Ct. 749 (1940). 
20 38 Stat. L. 242 (1913). 
21 310 U.S. 16 at 30. Emphasis added. 
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go into full operation they may well produce :fissionable material which 
it is hoped Congress will allow private companies to sell to other 
licensed companies. This material, if the act is changed to allow 
ownership by private individuals, would not, therefore, be government 
property in the same sense as in the cases cited above. It is possible 
to argue that all material which is derived from an initial loan of :fission-
able material from the AEC will be subject to the regulations which 
the AEC places upon its initial loan of material. The Court might 
hold, however, that this power to control health and safety conditions 
in the use of material is limited to that which is actually sold or loaned 
by the federal government. It might be possible to work out a lending 
or selling• agreement with the initial purchaser by which that purchaser 
agreed to make its subsequent purchasers abide by established health 
and safety standards. A heavy penalty could be imposed in the form 
of a damage clause in case the original purchaser of material does not 
insist on such agreements from its purchasers. Certainly, future de-
liveries of the government material may be cut off to those who refuse 
to conform. 
It should also be observed that in addition to controlling :fissionable 
material the government can control the disposition of raw materials 
which are necessary for the production of :fissionable material. The 
right to obtain such material could be restricted to those who use such 
material themselves and sell only to others who will use it in accordance 
with health and safety regulations established by the AEC. Even 
though private reactors do create new non-governmentally owned 
:fissionable material there will be a continuing need for source material 
over which the government has control. This would not, however, 
necessarily directly control all forms of radioactive materials in sub-
sequent hands, but the threat of cutting off future supplies is a strong 
deterrent against refusal to comply with AEC regulations. 
One other possibility under the power to dispose of property should 
be suggested. The Supreme Court in the Ashwander case held that 
the government can purchase or otherwise obtain the necessary equip-
ment and organization to dispose of government property in the most 
economical way. Since the government already owns facilities which 
can produce almost all kinds of fissionable and radioactive materials 
it is perfectly possible from a constitutional standpoint for Congress 
to decide to go into the private business of distributing :fissionable 
materials as well as radioactive isotopes for peacetime use. In this 
way a yardstick type of industry might be set up by Congress, at least 
from the standpoint of constitutional limitations, which could make it 
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very uncomfortable competitively for businesses which do not live up 
to the health and safety standards set by the AEC. This could take 
the form of undercutting such companies on all products made by them. 
This method of controlling health and safety practices, however, is an 
indirect one and would not be as effective as more direct control would 
be. 
2. The Commerce Power. The Supreme Court, particularly in 
the past fifteen or sixteen years, has interpreted the commerce clause 
as giving Congress an immense amount of power to control economic 
activities in this country. The cases so holding make it certain that 
a great deal of control is possible as to health and safety standards for 
workers in the atomic energy industry, if one is created by allowing 
private industry to enter the field. The only serious question will be 
how far can Congress go in controlling such standards for all workers 
who deal in any way with radioactive materials. 
The Court would undoubtedly approve a properly worded statute 
controlling the working conditions surrounding the production of 
materials which actually cross state lines. The Court has many times 
decided that Congress has plenary power to control the movement of 
goods across state lines. This has been true even though obviously in 
many cases the purpose of the statute was not to control the effect on 
the economy of the country but rather because Congress did not want 
the channels of interstate commerce to be used to transport materials 
of a nature or produced under conditions contrary to what Congress 
deemed good public policy and the welfare of the country generally. 
The plenary character of this power is well indicated by Supreme Court 
cases upholding prohibition against transportation of convict-made 
goods in interstate commerce;22 upholding prohibition of transportation 
of stolen motor vehicles across state lines;23 sustaining the National 
Firearms Act which prohibits interstate transportation of unregistered 
firearms;24 sustaining the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act pro-
hibitions against sale at retail of sulphathiazole tablets even though 
the sale occurred six months after the tablets had been brought into the 
state properly labeled;25 upholding an act prohibiting the shipment of 
lottery tickets across state lines;26 applying the Mann Act to an in-
22Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 57 S.Ct. 
277 (1937). 
23 Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345 (1925). 
24 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816 (1939). 
25 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 S.Ct. 331 (1948). 
26 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321 (1903). 
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dividual transporting a woman across state lines for purposes of an 
immoral practice having no commercial aspects;27 upholding a con-
viction under the Mann Act for transporting a woman across state lines 
for purposes of polygamous marriage;28 upholding the federal act pro-
hibit:4ig the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce when 
compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat and so compounded 
to resemble milk or cream;29 and upholding the power of Congress to 
exclude from interstate commerce goods produced under conditions 
detrimental "to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living 
necessary for health and general well-being."30 
These cases make it clear that, so long as Congress does not run 
afoul of some specific prohibition in the Constitution, there is nothing 
in the Tenth Amendment's reserved powers idea which prevents Con-
gress from prohibiting the shipment across state lines of goods which 
Congress deems to be inimical to the public health or welfare of the 
country, or which have been produced in a manner which is inimical 
to the public welfare. Justice Douglas summarized this power in 
Cleveland v. United States: 
''The fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter does 
not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional inter-
ference by Congress with the police powers of the States. The 
power of Congress over the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce is plenary; it may be used to_ defeat what are deemed to be 
immoral practices; and the fact that the means used may have 
'the quality of police regulations' is not consequential."31 
Justice Stone had expressed this idea earlier in the Darby case as 
follows: ''The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate com-
merce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of 
which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts 
are given no control."32 
It is also clear that Congress has the right to control conditions 
under which goods are "produced for commerce." Beginning with 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corpora- • 
tion,33 in 1937, the Court has consistently held that Congress can 
control the working conditions surrounding the production of goods 
27Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192 (1917). 
2s Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct. 13 (1946). 
29 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778 (1937). 
30 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 at 109, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941). 
31 329 U.S. 14 at 19, 67 S.Ct. 13 (1946). 
32 312 U.S. 100 at 115. 
33 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937). 
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for interstate commerce. In the Jones and Laughlin case the Court 
upheld the National Labor Relations Act as applied.to a steel company 
producing products which ultimately Howed into interstate commerce 
even though the activity regulated was production taking place only 
in one state. The Court held that the labor conditions might well 
"burden" or "affect'' commerce and therefore Congress could regulate 
them. In United States v. Darby,34 the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to all the workers in a 
plant where at least some of the goods (in that case most of the goods) 
produced would be shipped into interstate commerce. In upholding 
the act the Court said: 
'We think also that§ 15(a)(2), now under consideration, is 
sustainable independently of § 15(a)(l), which prohibits ship-
ment or transportation of the proscribed goods. As we have said 
the evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard labor 
conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate commerce 
for competition by the goods so produced with those produced 
under the prescribed or better labor conditions; and the consequent 
dislocation of the commerce itself caused by the impairment or 
destruction of local businesses by competition made effective 
through interstate commerce. The Act is thus directed at the 
suppression of a method or kind of competition in interstate com-
merce which it has in effect condemned as 'unfair,' as the Clayton 
Act has condemned other 'unfair methods of competition' made 
effective through interstate commerce. See Van Camp & Sons 
Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245; Federal Trade Comm'n 
v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304. 
"The Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act are 
familiar examples of the exertion of the commerce power to pro-
hibit or control activities wholly intrastate because of their effect 
on interstate commerce. See as to the Sherman Act, Northern 
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197; Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 196 U.S. 375; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 
525; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344; 
Local No. 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293; Stevens Co. v. 
Foster & Kleiser Co., 311 U.S. 255. As to the National Labor 
Relations Act, see National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 
supra, and cases cited. 
"The means adopted by§ 15(a)(2) for the protection of inter-
state commerce by the suppression of the production of the con-
demned goods for interstate commerce is so related to the com-
merce and so affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce 
84 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451 (1941). 
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power. See Currin v. Wallace, supra, I I. Congress, to attain 
its objective in the suppression of nationwide competition in inter-
state commerce by goods produced under substandard labor con-
ditions, has made no distinction as to the volume or amount of 
shipments in the commerce or of production for commerce by 
any particular shipper or producer. It recognized that in present 
day industry, competition by a small part may affect the whole 
and that the total effect of the competition of many small pro-
ducers may be great. See H. Rept. No. 2182, 75th Cong. 1st 
Sess., p. 7. The legislation aimed at a whole embraces all its 
parts. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, supra, 
606."35 
Some of the subsequent cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
clearly indicate how far Congress can go in controlling things that have 
some effect on interstate commerce and therefore are sufficiently a part 
of the production for commerce to be controllable by Congress. The 
act has been upheld when applied to maintenance personnel such as 
elevator operators, firemen, watchmen, carpenters, and porters in a 
loft building where manufacturers engaged in producing goods for 
interstate commerce had their establishments,36 to a night watchman 
of a veneer plant, 37 to the employees of a daily newspaper with a 
circulation of about 10,000 newspapers of which 45 copies went across 
state lines (½ of one percent), in this case applying the overtime 
regulations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,38 to the employees of a 
local electrical contractor who did commercial and industrial wiring 
for customers who were themselves engaged in the production of goods 
for commerce, 39 and to employees treating railroad ties for use in the 
same state by an interstate railroad.40 
In these cases the Court made it clear that not only employees who 
could be shown to have directly worked on goods going into interstate 
commerce, but also all employees engaged in a plant, where some of the 
goods produced went into interstate commerce, could be regulated 
simply as a matter of administrative efficiency in enforcing the statute. 
They also indicate that Congress can regulate the laboring conditions 
of employees who in effect are doing maintenance or other work on 
equipment or supplies which will be used to produce goods in interstate 
commerce or carry on interstate activities. 
35 Id. at 122-123. Emphasis added. 
36 Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S.Ct. 1116 (1942). 
37Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540, 64 S.Ct. 320 (1943). 
SSMabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 66 S.Ct. 511 (1946). 
89 Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 66 S.Ct. 413 (1946). 
40 Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 73 S.Ct. 565 (1953). 
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The Supreme Court in another series of cases has interpreted the 
Constitution as giving to Congress the power to regulate those activities, 
in themselves wholly intrastate, which "substantially affect" interstate 
commerce. In 1911 the Supreme Court decided Southern Railway 
Co. v. United States.41 The Court upheld the application of the 
Federal Safety Appliance Act governing railroads to cars used solely 
in transporting goods within the boundaries of a given state. The 
Court justified this regulation on the ground that the railroad was used 
as a highway of both interstate and intrastate commerce, that the 
employees and the tracks and much of the equipment were used inter-
changeably, and that, even as to cars which might not be used inter-
changeably, the employees have to work on both interstate and intra-
state cars and an accident on an intrastate car might well burden the 
How of goods in interstate commerce. In Railroad Commission of 
Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Co.,42 the 
Supreme Court upheld the grant of power to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to regulate intrastate rates on railroads in Wisconsin con-
trary to an order of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission. The Court 
there said: 
"Commerce is a unit and does not regard state lines and while 
under the Constitution, interstate and intrastate commerce are 
ordinarily subject to regulations by different sovereignties, yet 
when they are so mingled together that the supreme authority, 
the Nation, cannot exercise complete effective control over inter-
state commerce without incidental regulation of intrastate com-
merce, such incidental regulation is not an invasion of state 
authority or a violation of the proviso."43 
Language quoted above from the Darby case also supports this con-
clusion. 
Then in 1942 the Supreme Court decided Wickard v. Filburn.44 
The Court upheld the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
allocating wheat acreage to a farmer who was raising grain on his own 
farm to feed his own livestock. The Court there said: 
"But even if appellee' s activity be local and though it may not 
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect 
41222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2 (1911). 
42 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232 (1922). 
43 Id. at 588. 
44 317 U.S. Ill, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942). 
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is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 
'indirect' ."45 
In holding that there was the necessary effect from this man's 11.1 
acres of wheat the Court said that all such persons produced about 20 
percent of the average · national yield and therefore the cumulative 
effect of such production was a substantial one on interstate commerce. 
The Court then went on to state: 
"It is said, however, that this Act, forcing some farmers into 
the market to buy what they could provide for themselves, is an 
unfair promotion of the markets and prices of specializing wheat 
growers. It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining 
hand on the self-interest of the regulated and that advantages 
from the regulation commonly fall to others. The conflicts of 
economic interest between the regulated and those who advantage 
by it are wisely le~ under our system to resoliition by the Congress 
under its more fl.exible and responsible legislative process. Such 
conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination. And 
with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation 
we have nothing to do."46 
In American Power Company v. SEC,47 decided in 1946, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act which allows the SEC to order dissolution of holding companies 
under the conditions prescribed by the act. The company was only 
a holding company and therefore shipped nothing in interstate com-
merce. The Court, however, held the company subject to the act 
because it was in interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"Congress, of course, has undoubted power under the com-
merce clause to impose relevant conditions and requirements on 
those who use the channels of interstate commerce so that those 
channels will not be conduits for promoting or perpetuating eco-
nomic evils. North American Co. v. SEC, supra; United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100; Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432. 
Thus, to the extent that corporate business is transacted through 
such channels, affecting commerce in more states than one, Con-
gress may act directly with respect to that business to protect what 
it conceives to be the national welfare. It may prescribe appro-
priate regulations and determine the conditions under which that 
business may be pursued. It may compel changes in the voting 
rights and other privileges of stockholders. It may order the 
45 Id. at 125. Emphasis added. 
46 Id. at 129. Emphasis added. 
47 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133 (1946). 
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divestment or rearrangement of properties. It may order the 
reorganization or dissolution of corporations. In short, Congress 
is completely uninhibited by the commerce clause in selecting the 
means considered necessary for bringing about t};ie desired con-
ditions in the channels of interstate commerce. Any limitations 
are to be found in other sections of the Constitution. Gibbons 
11. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196."48 
One other case well illustrating the kind of regulation that certainly 
could be imposed by Congress to protect health and safety or gener~l 
welfare should be noted. In Consolidated Edison 11. NLRB,49 the 
Supreme Court upheld the application of the National Labor Relations 
Act to Consolidated Edison which had allegedly engaged in unfair 
labor practices. In upholding the jurisdiction of the Board over Con-
solidated Edison the Court held that the power which was produced 
by the company was a vital factor in the production of goods in inter-
state commerce and therefore could be regulated even though no 
electricity was sold for resale outside the state. The Court there said: 
"The effect upon interstate and foreign commerce of an inter-
ruption through industrial strife of the service of the petitioning 
companies was vividly described by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
in these words: 'Instantly, the terminals and trains of three great 
interstate railroads would cease to operate; interstate communica-
tion by telegraph, telephone, and radio would stop; lights main-
tained as aids to navigation would go out; and the business of 
interstate ferries and of foreign steamships, whose docks are 
lighted and operated by electric energy, would be greatly impeded. 
Such effects we cannot regard as indirect and remote.' 95 F. 2d 
390, 394."50 
In the light of these cases it seems fair to predict that the Court 
would uphold the application of health and safety regulations to the 
atomic energy business even though conducted by private enterprise. 
As to goods which are actually shipped across the state lines, such as 
radioisotopes often are now, there is no question but that the Suprem~ 
Court would interpret the Constitution as allowing Congress under 
its commerce power to regulate the manner in which those goods were 
produced. Likewise, since health and safety regulations are no less 
directly connected to the economy of the country than are wage and 
hour regulations, there seems little question as to Congress' power also 
48 Id. at 99-100. 
49 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938). 
50 Id. at 221. 
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to control the health and safety standards used in the production of 
goods "for commerce," as in the Darby and following cases. 
This leaves only those who are either not making products for 
commercial purposes at all or who are making products for sale solely 
within state lines. The ability to regulate health and safety standards 
in these cases will be dependent upon how far the Court will allow 
Congress to carry the ideas upheld in the Darby and Filburn cases, as 
well as the Southern Railway and Wisconsin Rate cases. Since there 
undoubtedly will be considerable commerce in radioisotopes and per-
haps even in :fissionable material across state lines it would seem quite 
likely that in the light of the Filburn case Congress will be allowed to 
control even intrastate sales and transfers because competition from 
them will have the necessary "substantial effect on interstate com-
merce." Assuming there will be an interstate commodity market in 
radioactive materials, even producing such materials for self-consump-
tion may have as much effect on the interstate market as did the 
production of 11 acres of wheat in Wickard v. Filburn. What is so 
produced will not be bought on the market and this affects that market. 
Certainly the amount of control that Congress can exercise in the light 
of Wickard v. Filburn is very substantial and probably is ample to take 
care of nearly all if not all production of :fissionable or other radioactive 
materials. Certainly if Congress is careful in drafting the act in this 
respect and makes :findings as to the impact that such "unfair" com-
petition may have on the interstate transactions in such commodities 
produced in accordance with congressional regulations there is every 
reason to believe that the Court will allow Congress such regulatory 
power. 
3. The War Power. Chief Justice Hughes, in referring to the 
federal war power in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blais-
dell,51 stated that it "is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it 
permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme 
cooperative effort to preserve the nation." We are all familiar with the 
extent to which the Court has followed this philosophy in allowing 
Congress during World War II to control the economic and other 
activities of nearly everyone in the United States. The Court upheld 
the Selective Service Act in several cases,62 it upheld the price control 
61290 U.S. 398 at 426, 54 S.Ct. 231 (1934). 
62Billings v. Truesdale, 321 U.S. 542, 64 S.Ct. 737 (1944); Falbo v. United States, 
320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346 (1944); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423 
(1946)-not the present writer. 
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and rationing acts,53 it allowed the seizure of property held by enemy 
aliens,54 and likewise approved, from the standpoint of constitution-
ality, the Japanese exclusion orders involving the removal of Japanese 
persons from sensitive West Coast areas.55 If health and safety regu-
lations in the use of radioactive materials could be brought within the 
war power the scope of permissible regulation is extremely broad. This 
at least would be the case were we in actual war and certainly there is 
some reason to believe that the Court might allow such legislation even 
in peacetime, particularly during a period of such uneasy peace as at 
present. The real question is just how far will the Court allow Con-
gress to go in preparing for war. 
Congress clearly has some powers to provide for war even in peace-
time; e.g., the powers to provide and regulate the army, navy and 
militia.56 Under these powers the AEC has continued to produce 
fissionable material to provide for our defense needs in case we do 
become involved in another war. No question has really been raised 
as to the ability of Congress to provide adequate forces for the event-
uality of war. As mentioned before, there is no question as to Con-
gress' power to regulate the health and safety standards used by con-
tractors and suppliers furnishing material to the federal government 
for use as potential war weapons.57 This, however, would not, as such, 
necessarily indicate that Congress could control health and safety 
regulations in private industry where it is not expected that the products 
would go toward the national defense effort in a direct manner such as 
into military stockpiles. The question in any case would be how far 
Congress could go in preparing for the eventuality of war when this 
preparation will entail taking over regulation of areas which, other than 
for the war power, Congress might not be able to control. 
As related to our particular problem of peacetime utilization of 
atomic energy it might be argued as follows: in time of actual conB.ict 
our need for trained personnel is tremendous-we must be sure they 
have not been exposed already to the maximum amount of permissible 
radiation-therefore, Congress needs to control the health and safety 
standards to be applied to persons handling such materials even in 
peacetime. In many ways our thinking today has shifted to the point 
where we recognize that the maintenance and training of an adequate 
53 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 
321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944). 
54Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 68 S.Ct. 179 (1947). 
55 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944). 
56 U.S. CoNsT., Art. I, §8. 
57 See note 15 supra. 
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civil defense organization may be almost as important as the main-
tenance of a trained army to be used in time of conB.ict. Unless we 
have an adequate reserve of civilians who know how to use radioactive 
material and who have not been overexposed in prior use of such 
material it certainly is arguable that our whole ability to recuperate 
from the initial blow of unannounced attacks would be seriously im-
paired if not made impossible. It could be argued that this is par-
ticularly true in the area of atomic energy because of the peculiar nature 
of the material being handled and its extreme danger to the country 
as a whole in case of atomic attack. Adding to this the present uneasy 
world situation with the continuation of the cold war and our need to 
be prepared for any eventuality, it could be concluded from the above 
premises that Congress must, in order adequately to prepare for war, 
control the health and safety standards used in handling radioactive 
materials, even when used in private peacetime industry. 
Actually, this question as applied to atomic energy is quite similar 
to the question of whether Congress can constitutionally provide for 
universal military training even in times of peace. This latter question 
as to universal military training has been discussed from the consti-
tutional standpoint by Freeman, "The Constitutionality of Peacetime 
Conscription,"58 and Montgomery, "Peacetime Compulsory Military 
T raining."59 These men take opposite positions. It is my own opinion 
that, in the light of the war power cases, Congress will be allowed to 
provide for universal military training if it decides this is necessary to 
"raise and support armies" preparatory to defending our country in time 
of actual war, any involuntary servitude arguments to the contrary 
notwithstanding.60 Assuming the correctness of this statement the 
question for our purposes is whether the necessity for providing for 
well-trained and well-protected civilian employees who know how to 
use radioactive materials is as important for our preparation for war as 
is the training of soldiers who are to actually serve in the armed forces. 
In the light of the cumulative effect of radiation exposure, with which 
all persons conversant with the technical aspects of radioactive materials 
58 31 VA. L. R.Ev. 40 (1944). 
59 31 VA. L. R.Ev. 628 (1945). 
60 The involuntary servitude arguments as to wartime conscription were rejected in 
the cases cited note 52 supra, and in the earlier case under the act for World War I, Axver 
v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. 159 (1918), the Court concluding that there 
was nothing in the 13th Amendment's history·inclicating that it was meant to prevent the 
Congress from exercising its powers to raise and support an army. There likewise is nothing 
to suggest that the 13th Amendment meant to draw a line between involuntary servitude 
in time of war and in peacetime. For what it is worth, admittedly there is nothing to 
indicate an intent not to draw such a line. 
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are familiar, Congress might decide that there was a peculiar necessity 
for regulating the handling of materials even in times of peace and even 
in peaceful private enterprise. In this respect the training of such 
personnel and the creation of the reserve of experienced persons in this 
area is quite different from the maintenance of mechanics and other 
skilled workers in other areas where we can adequately train them 
through spending federal funds for training periods and courses. 
Merely training workers in how to handle radioactive materials safely 
would not be enough in the case of atomic energy operations because, 
if overexposed in their private work, they would not then be useful in 
time of war because they would have already been subjected to the 
maximum exposure which their bodies could safely tolerate. It certainly 
could be argued that this would at least be true in the initial stages of 
developing a peacetime atomic energy industry because we as yet do 
not have standards of sufficient certainty that states could be expected 
to adopt uniform regulations. It might well be that, at some time in 
the future when sufficient information will have been amassed to 
make such standards with reasonable accuracy, such regulation would 
be turned over to the state, but in this initial period, because of the 
crucial character of overexposure, control must be kept over health and 
safety standards as a matter of preparation for national defense. Should 
Congress so declare the necessity for regulating health and safety 
standards for purposes of defense preparation the Court might well 
accede to this congressional declaration, at least at the present time in 
the light of the present world situation. 
There is practically no case authority directly or even closely in 
point, but we do have some indication of the Court's attitude toward 
regulations under the war power in times of cessation of hostilities. 
In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers Co.,61 the Supreme Court upheld 
the National Prohibition Act passed during World War I but continued 
in effect after the actual cessation of hostilities. The attitude of the 
Court in that case is well summarized in the following language from 
the opinion: 
"G:mceding, then, for the purposes of the present case, that 
the question of the continued validity of the war prohibition act 
under the changed circumstances depends upon whether it ap-
pears that there is no longer any necessity for the prohibition of 
the sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes, it remains to be 
said that on obvious grounds every reasonable intendrnent must 
be made in favor of its continuing validity, the prescribed period 
a1251 U.S. 146, 40 S.Ct. 106 (1920). 
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of limitation not having arrived; that to Congress in the exercise of 
its powers, not least the war power upon which the very life of the 
nation depends, a wide latitude of discretion must be accorded; 
and that it would require a clear case to justify a court in declaring 
that such an act, passed for such a purpose, had ceased to have 
force because the power of Congress no longer continued. In 
view of facts of public knowledge, some of which have been re-
ferred to, that the treaty of peace has not yet been concluded, that 
the railways are still under national control by virtue of the war 
powers, that other war activities have not been brought to a close, 
and that it can not even be said that the man power of the nation 
has been restored to a peace footing, we are unable to conclude 
that the act has ceased to be valid."62 
Following World War II the federal government continued rent 
control over rental property in certain areas and the Supreme Court 
upheld this continuation of the war power in Woods v. Miller Com-
pany, 63 even though all actual hostilities had ceased to exist three years 
earlier. The Court held that, because the serious housing shortage 
was created by the embargo on building during the war, Congress could 
continue to legislate to meet this condition caused by the war. The 
language of the majority opinion states: 
· "We recognize the force of the argument that the effects of war 
under modem conditions may be felt in the economy for years and 
years, and that if the war power· can be used in days of peace to 
treat all the wounds which war inB.icts on our society, it may not 
only swallow up all other powers of Congress but largely obliterate 
the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments as well. There are no 
such implications in today's decision. We deal here with the con-
sequences of a housing deficit greatly intensified during the period 
of hostilities by the war effort. Any power, of course, can be 
abused. But we cannot assume that Congress is not alert to its 
constitutional responsibilities. And the question whether the war 
power has been properly employed in cases such as this is open to 
judicial inquiry."64 
It is true that in each of these cases the question was one of con-
tinuation of the war power into peacetime because of continuation of 
effects of the actual conduct of war. However, it seems perfectly 
proper for Congress to have at least some power to make adequate 
preparation for war itself. In fact, no one has ever questioned the 
s2 Id. at 163. Emphasis added. 
63 333 U.S. 138, 68 S.Ct. 421 (1948). 
64 Id. at 143-144. Emphasis added. 
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power of Congress to provide for navies, armies, and the militia, prob-
ably because specific authorization is given in the Constitution. The 
question always is just how far can Congress go in these matters. The 
implications of the Woods and Hamilton cases may well be that at least 
some preparatory measures can be taken above merely providing for 
military personnel. The question would seem to be one of whether 
it is reasonably necessary in order to prepare adequately for eventual 
war that Congress regulate the manner in which workers are exposed 
to radiation as they handle radioactive materials in peacetime operation. 
The atomic energy hazards are peculiar enough so that such prepara-
tory measures might be upheld by the Court. It would be wise for 
Congress to place such factual conclusions in the statute itself or at 
least in the hearings so as to lay the necessary foundation for justifying 
the health and safety regulations as an exercise of the war power. 
It is important to recognize, as stated before, that this is an opinion 
as to what the Court might hold as to congressional power, not an 
opinion as to whether or not Congress ought to adopt the policy. The 
conclusion as to what the Court might do is based on language to the 
effect that Congress is not to be assumed to be unaware of its con-
stitutional responsibilities, on the language concerning the broad lati-
tude which Congress has in exercising its recognized powers, and on 
the stated reluctance of the Court to impose its ideas as to what is de-
sirable upon Congress, even though the Court does reserve to itself 
ultimate review power. While not now actually engaged in war with 
the consequent pressures to allow the Congress to do about anything 
it thinks necessary to win the war, it must be recognized that this is 
a time of extreme international tension and great potential danger 
which Congress may feel calls for extraordinary measures of prepara-
tory defense. The Court would undoubtedly hesitate a long time be-
fore deciding that Congress' conclusions as to the necessity for such 
regulations are not sufficiently justified by the present state of our 
knowledge about atomic energy and of foreign relations. 
4. Power to Provide for the General Welfare. Article 1, section 
8 of the Constitution states that Congress may "provide for the . . . 
general welfare." In 1937, in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,65 and 
Helvering v. Davis,66 the Supreme Court upheld the unemployment 
compensation and the old age benefits provisions of the Social Security 
65 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883 (1937). 
00 301 U.S. 619, 57 S.Ct. 904 (1937). 
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Act.67 The Court there said that the power of the federal government 
to spend for the general welfare was broad enough to allow spending 
to alleviate the lack of funds among the unemployed and the aged since 
these problems were "plainly national in area and dimensions." The 
Court also clearly indicated that the question of what is for the general 
welfare is largely a question for Congress, not the courts: 
"The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The 
discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, 
a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This is 
now familiar law. 'When such a contention comes here we 
naturally require a showing that by no reasonable possibility_ can 
the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discretion 
permitted to the Congress.' [cases omitted] Nor is the concept 
of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial 
a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being 
of the Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the 
times."68 
In the light of this attitude the Court surely would hold that Con-
gress can encourage proper handling of radioactive materials through 
expenditure of federal funds, even though control over such matters 
was considered outside its powers otherwise. 69 Certainly federal funds 
could be spent to gather information to be used in recommending health 
and safety standards. In addition, if Congress felt it desirable, a pro-
gram of financial and technical assistance could be made available to 
such states as adopted standards approved by the AEC, as is done with 
the present federal grants-in-aids programs. Attractive financial bene-
67 49 Stat. L. 620 ff. (1935), now, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. (1952; 1953 Supp.) 
§301 et seq., and 26 U.S.C.A. (1945; 1953 Supp.) §§480, 1400, 1410, 1600 et seq. 
68 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 at 640-641. Emphasis added. 
69 Actually there have been very few cases involving the constitutionality of such 
spending programs because of the party in interest problem. See discussion p. 361 infra. 
To the Social Security Act cases should be added Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 47 S.Ct. 
265 (1927) (spending with a reverse twist through means of a tax exemption), and Cin-
cinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 57 S.Ct. 764 (1937), both cited by 
Justice Douglas in the Steward Machine Co. case. There is extensive literature on the 
welfare spending power; e.g., Corwin, "The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the 
Maternity Act," 36 HAB.v. L. REv. 548 (1923); Grant, "Commerce, Production, and the 
Fiscal Powers of Congress," 45 YALE L.J. 751, 991 (1936); Bergman, ''Federal Power to 
Tax and to Spend," 31 MrnN. L. REv. 328 (1947); Turner, "The Fifth Horseman of the 
Apocalypse!" 22 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 19 (1947); Lutz, "The General Welfare Clause: 
Does It Authorize a Welfare State?" 36 A.B.A.J. 196 (1950). While some of the writers 
are critical of the interpretation, they all recognize the broad implications of the Social 
Security cases. See also, cases and materials cited in DoWLING, CASES ON CoNsTITUTIONAL 
LAw, 4th ed., 435-436 (1950); KA.UPER, CAsEs ON CoNsTITUTioNAL LAw 237, 246 
(Lithoprinted, 1952). There is also a difficult party in interest problem in objecting to 
competition from the government as illustrated in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 
306 U.S. 118, 59 S.Ct. 366 (1939). 
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fits might also be used as an inducement to encourage private com-
pliance with federal standards. If these were made attractive enough, 
few would feel free to refuse to comply. This might be described as 
the power to buy compliance rather than demand it. 
Admittedly such methods of control would not be as complete as 
those which could be enforced as a legal obligation, such as under the 
commerce or war powers. This approach would also necessitate the 
expenditure of more federal funds in the form of the monetary benefits 
provided. · 
5. The Power to Tax. Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution 
gives to Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes." This clause 
theoretically does not give to Congress a separate regulatory power, 
though taxation is a permissible means of carrying out regulation of 
activities which can be controlled under one of the other enumerated 
powers.70 The theory has been that tax statutes can be upheld only 
when a revenue purpose is being served. 
The economic and social impact of taxes, however, cannot be denied. 
Our graduated income tax does effectuate some redistribution of wealth 
and the luxury taxes undoubtedly do rechannel some industrial en-
deavors into areas not taxed so heavily. Actually, the Court over a 
long period of years has upheld tax measures having a much greater 
regulatory impact than those mentioned and which were adopted by 
Congress with motives other than simply revenue raising in mind. It 
is also possible to combine the power to tax with the power to spend in 
such a manner as to achieve in fact a great measure of regulatory power. 
One of the earliest and most significant cases upholding as a rev-
enue measure a tax which obviously also imposed economic regulation 
is McCray 11. United States,71 decided in 1904. The Court there 
upheld a statute which imposed a tax of ten cents per pound upon 
oleomargarine, "Provided, When oleomargarine is free from artificial 
coloration that causes it to look like butter of any shade of yellow, said 
tax shall be one-fourth of one cent per pound." Two excerpts from 
the opinion are indicative of the attitude of the Court: 
70Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 533 (1869), is the classic example. The 
Court there upheld a federal tax on notes issued by others than the federal government so 
high as to be prohibitory as a practical matter. It was justified as an exercise of the fiscal 
power of Congress as well as the power to tax. 
On the general problem of using the federal taxing power for purposes other than revenue 
raising, see notes, 28 NoTRB DAMB LAWYER 127 (1952); 14 UNIV. Pxn-s. L. REv. 71 
(1952). See earlier articles collected in KAuPER, CASES ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 214 
(Lithoprinted, 1952). 
71195 U.S. 27, 24 S.Ct. 769 (1904). 
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"It being thus demonstrated that the motive or purpose of 
Congress in adopting the acts in question may not be inquired 
into, we ~re brought to consider the contentions relied upon to 
show that the acts assailed were beyond the power of Congress, 
putting entirely out of view all considerations based upon purpose 
or motive. 
"The right of Congress to tax within its delegated power being 
unrestrained, except as limited by the Constitution, it was within 
the authority conferred on Congress to select the objects upon 
which an excise should be laid. It therefore follows that, in 
exerting its power, no want of due process of law could possibly 
result, because that body chose to impose an excise on artificially 
colored oleomargarine and not upon natural butter artificially 
colored. The judicial power may not usurp the functions of the 
legislative in order to control that branch of the government in the 
performance of its lawful duties."72 
The Narcotic Drug Act of 191473 was upheld in United States v. 
Doremus.74 This act requires registration and payment of a special 
tax by all who deal in opium or its derivatives and makes unlawful the 
sale of such materials except to persons having orders on forms issued 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The act also forbids any 
person to obtain the drug for any purpose other than in the conduct 
of a lawful business or profession. The regulatory effect upon peddling 
drugs to dope addicts is obvious, yet the Court upheld the statute as 
an exercise of the power to tax. 
In Sonzinsky v. United States,75 decided in 1937, the Court upheld 
the National Firearms Act of 193476 which provides that every dealer 
in :firearms, as defined in the act, must register and pay an annual 
occupation tax of $200 and an additional tax of $200 on each transfer 
of any :firearm. "Firearm" is given a very special definition which 
makes it perfectly obvious that it was aimed at "sawed-off" shotguns, 
machine guns and silencers in vogue among gangsters during the 1920' s 
and 1930's. The regulations issued under the act also require the 
identification of all purchasers. The Court said: 
"The case is not one where the statute contains regulatory 
provisions related to a purported tax in such a way as has enabled 
this Court to say in other cases that the latter is a penalty resorted 
to as a means of enforcing the regulations. See Child Labor Tax 
12 Id. at 59 and 61. Emphasis added. 
73 38 Stat. L. 785 (1914), now 26 U.S.C.A. (1948; 1953 Supp.) §2550 et seq. 
74 249 U.S. 86, 39 S.Ct. -214 (1919). 
75 300 U.S. 506, 57 S.Ct. 554 (1937). 
76 48 Stat. L. 1236 (1934), now 26 U.S.C.A. (1948; 1953 Supp.) §2720 et seq. 
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Case, 259 U.S. 20, 35; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44; Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238. Nor is the subject of the tax 
described or treated as criminal by the taxing statute. Compare 
United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287. Here§ 2 contains 
no regulation other than the mere registration provisions, which 
are obviously supportable as in aid of a revenue purpose. On its 
face it is only a taxing measure, and we are asked to say that the 
tax, by virtue of its deterrent effect on the activities taxed, operates 
as a regulation which is beyond the congressional power. 
"Here the annual tax of $200 is productive of some revenue. 
We are not free to speculate as to the motives which moved Con-
gress to impose it, or as to the extent to which it may operate to 
restrict the activities taxed. As it is not attended by an offensive 
regulation, and since it operates as a tax, it is within the national 
taxing power."77 
The present Supreme Court has taken a similar view. In 1950, in 
United States v. Sanchez,18 they upheld the validity of the Federal 
Marihuana Tax Act79 with the following language: 
"It is obvious that § 2590, by imposing a severe burden on 
transfers to unregistered persons, implements the congressional 
purpose of restricting traffic in marihuana to accepted industrial 
and medicinal channels. Hence the attack here rests on the reg-
ulatory character and prohibitive burden of the section as well as 
the penal nature of the imposition. But despite the regulatory 
effect and the close resemblance to a penalty, it does not follow 
that the levy is invalid. 
"First. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease 
to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even def-
initely deters the activities taxed. Sonzinsky v. United States, 
300 U.S. 506, 513-514 (1937). The principle applies even 
though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, Sonzinsky v. 
United States, supra, or the revenue purpose of the tax may be 
secondary, Hampton &- Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 
(1928). Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches 
on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. As 
was pointed out in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 
(1934): 'From the beginning of our government, the courts have 
sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of 
effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the 
constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation 
directly addressed to their accomplishments.' These principles 
11 300 U.S. 506 at 513-514. 
78 340 U.S. 42, 71 S.Ct. 108 (1937). 
79 50 Stat. L. 551 (1937), now 26 U.S.C.A. (1948; 1953 Supp.) §2590 et seq. 
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are controlling here. The tax in question is a legitimate exercise 
of the taxing power despite its collateral regulatory purpose and 
effect. "80 
Three years later, in United States v. K.ahriger,81 the Court went 
even further in uphold:ing a tax act which had a largely regulatory 
motive underlying it. The act imposes a tax on all persons in the 
gambling business and requires registration of name and place of 
business. Such information is made available to the public, which 
just happens to include state enforcement officers. The Court's at-
titude is expressed in the following excerpts from the opinion: 
"It is conceded that a federal excise tax does not cease to be 
valid merely because it discourages or deters tlie activities taxed. 
Nor is the tax invalid because the revenue obtained is negligible. 
Appellee, however, argues that the sole purpose of the statute is to 
penalize only illegal gambling in the states through the guise of 
a tax measure. As with the above excise taxes which we have held 
to be valid, the instant tax has a regulatory effect. But regardless 
of its regulatory effect, the wagering tax produces revenue. As 
such it surpasses both the narcotics and firearms taxes which we 
have found valid. 
"It is axiomatic that the power of Congress to tax is extensive 
and sometimes falls with crushing effect on businesses deemed 
unessential or inimical to the public welfare, or where, as in 
dealings with narcotics, the collection of the tax also is difficult. 
... That case [Veazie Bank v. Penna, 8 Wall. 533 (1869)] 
allowed a tax, however, that obliterated from circulation all state 
bank notes. A reason was that 'the judicial cannot prescribe to 
the legislative departments of the government limitations upon the 
exercise of its acknowledged powers.' Id., at 548. The tax cases 
cited above in the third preceding paragraph followed that theory. 
It is hard to understand- why the power to tax should raise more 
doubts because of indirect effects than other federal powers. . . . 
"Nor do we find the registration requirements of the wagering 
tax offensive. All that is required is the filing of names, addresses, 
and places of business. This is quite general in tax returns. Such 
data are directly and intimately related to the collectiqn qf the tax 
and are 'obviously supportable as in aid of a revenue purpose.' 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, at 513 .. The regis-
tration provisions make the tax simpler to collect. "82 · 
These cases make it clear that Congress could impose. an excise 
so 340 U.S. 42 at 44-45. Emphasis added. 
s1345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510 (1953). 
s2 Id. at 28, 31-32. Emphasis added. 
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tax upon those who deal in radioactive materials. Even the few cases 
which have struck down federal taxes do not cast any doubt on this 
proposition. In order to make effective the administration of the tax, 
even though fairly nominal in amount, reports undoubtedly could be 
required and inspections of plants and facilities used in handling the 
materials could be authorized under the taxing power. The next step 
would be to require reports and authorize inspections concerning health 
and safety standards used by the taxpayer. Then provision might be 
made prohibiting transfer of radioactive material to persons who do 
not have adequate facilities and health and safety standards to handle 
such materials safely. This would seem no more unrelated to a revenue 
purpose than the requirement that none can purchase narcotics except 
in the conduct of a lawful business in such drugs which was upheld 
in the Doremus case in the following language: 
"The provisions of § 2, to which we _have referred, aim to con-
fine sales to registered dealers and to those dispensing the drugs as 
physicians, and to those who come to dealers with legitimate pre-
scriptions of physicians. Congress, with full power over the 
subject, short of arbitrary and unreasonable action which is not 
to be assumed, inserted these provisions in an act specifically pro-
viding for the raising of revenue. Considered of themselves, we 
think they tend to keep the traffic aboveboard and subject to in-
spection by those authorized to collect the revenue. They tend 
to diminish the opportunity of unauthorized persons to obtain the 
drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax imposed 
by the federal law. This case well illustrates the possibility which 
may have induced Congress to insert the provisions limiting sales 
to registered dealers and requiring patients to obtain these drugs 
as a medicine from physicians or upon regular prescriptions."83 
In predicting what the present Supreme Court would do with such 
a statute, account must be taken of such cases as Bailey v. Drexel Furni-
ture Company,84 and United States v. Constantine,85 decided between 
the Doremus (1919) and Sonzinsky (1937) cases. The statute in-
volved in the Drexel Furniture case imposed a l O percent income tax 
on all businesses which knowingly hired even one person coming under 
the act's definition of child labor. The tax was invalidated on the 
ground that it was apparent on the face of statute that it was regulatory 
only. The Court pointed to the scienter requirement, the provision 
for Labor Department enforcement, and the imposition of the tax in 
sa 249 U.S. 86 at 94-95, 39 S.Ct. 214 (1919). 
84 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.Ct. 449 (1922). 
85 296 U.S. 287, 56 S.Ct. 223 (1935). 
360 MrcmGAN LAw R:Evmw [ Vol. 52 
full whether one or 500 children were employed. The Court said 
these made it clear on its face (not because of the Court's lmowledge 
of hidden motives or economic impact) that the tax was a penalty and 
not for the purpose of raising revenue. United States 11. Constantine 
struck down the "special excise tax" of $1000 on liquor dealers when 
they carried on their business contrary to local state or municipal law, 
there being no tax when state laws were not violated. The majority 
held that such a condition made it obvious that it was a penalty for 
violation of a state law and not a revenue measure. Cardozo, Stone, 
and Brandeis dissented and made the following observation: 
"Congress may reasonably have believed that, in view of the 
attendant risks, a business carried on illegally and furtively is 
likely to yield larger profits than one transacted openly by law-
abiding men. Not repression, but payment commensurate with 
the gains is thus the animating motive."86 
The objections found in the Drexel Furniture case could be 
avoided easily; scienter should be omitted, administration of the tax 
should be by the Treasury Department, and the tax should be imposed 
upon each transaction cumulatively rather than in one lump sum for 
the first violation of proper health and safety standards. Perhaps the 
Constantine case also could be avoided since there would be no viola-
tion of a penal law upon which payment of the tax is conditioned, but 
simply desirable health and safety standards established by the AEC. 
The language of the Court in the Sanchez case is pertinent here: 
"Since his tax liability does not in effect rest on criminal con-
duct, the tax can be properly called a civil rather than a criminal 
sanction. The fact Congress provided civil procedure for col-
lection indicates its intention that the tax be treated as such. 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)."87 
In addition, we should note that the views of the dissenters in the 
Constantine case are followed by the present Supreme Court in other 
areas of constitutional law, such as the right of Congress under the 
commerce clause to prohibit emJ?loyment of child labor and underpaid 
workers, and so may also be followed as to the power to tax. 
Actually, if the McCray case (oleomargarine tax) is still good law, 
and it was cited with approval in the Kahriger case, a good case can be 
made for a federal tax which places a very low tax on those who 
manufacture, process, or handle radioactive materials safely and a 
86 Id. at 297. Emphasis added. 
87 340 U.S. 42 at 45. 
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much higher one on those who do not do so. This would seem no more 
a police power measure than the distinction of colored margarine up-
held in the McCray case. It could also be argued that making radio-
active products without proper safety standards would be more profit-
able and therefore could be taxed more heavily, as suggested by the 
dissenters in the Constantine case. 
In any event, in the light of the Kahriger case, surely the AEC 
could be authorized to make available to the public, including state 
officials, a list compiled from tax returns of all who handle radioactive 
materials. 
One other real possibility should be mentioned. If the spending 
power were properly combined with the power to tax it is quite possible 
that Congress might effectively regulate health and safety standards. 
As indicated, it is clear that Congress can tax the privilege of handling 
radioactive materials, even if the tax be burdensome. Then Congress 
could provide, under the spending power, for subsidies and· technical 
assistance to those persons who handle radioactive material in accord-
ance with health and safety regulations set by the AEC. It seems likely 
that the Court would say that the problem of safely handling such 
materials and thereby protecting the health of our workers is a proper 
subject for general welfare spending. Such combination of tax and 
spending power has been upheld in such cases as Cincinnati Soap 
Company 11. United States,88 upholding a coconut oil processing tax 
earmarked for return to the Philippine Islands, and Steward Machine 
Company 11. Davis,89 and Helvering 11. Davis,0O upholding the Social 
Security Act programs. 
If there is doubt as to the power of Congress to spend to achieve 
proper health and safety standards then Congress should levy the tax 
on all who handle radioactive materials in one statute and then in a 
separate statute appropriate money to ''buy" compliance with federal 
standards. Under the holding of Massachusetts 11. Mellon, 91 an in-
dividual taxpayer of the United States cannot object to the spending 
of federal funds. In that case the taxpayer was seeking to object to the 
Maternity Act:92 provisions appropriating money to such states as accept 
and comply with federal provisions aimed at reducing maternal and 
infant mortality. The Court held that the taxpayer's interest was too 
88 301 U.S. 308, 57 S.Ct. 764 (1937). 
89 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883 (1937). 
00 301 U.S. 619, 57 S.Ct. 904 (1937). 
01262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923). 
02 42 Stat. L. 224 (1921), now 42 U.S.C.A. (1952) §701 et seq. 
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insignificant, since he was only one of many millions of taxpayers to 
raise the question. Only when a tax is earmarked within the same 
statute for a specific spending program rather than for payment into 
the general funds has the Court allowed a taxpayer to object to a 
spending program as not within the power of Congress.93 
Conclusions · 
An attempt has been made to analyze every reasonably possible 
basic constitutional justification for congressional control of health and 
safety standards. This analysis indicates that substantial congressional 
control of even wholly private operations is not only possibly but quite 
likely constitutional should the government monopoly be given up. 
Certainly, under the power to dispose of government property, and the 
commerce power, and even perhaps the war power, Congress will be 
allowed a degree of control that will cover most of the important uses 
that will be made of radioactive material. It even seems perfectly 
within the realm of possibility that the Supreme Court would uphold 
congressional control of the handling of substantially all such materials. 
Even the tax power is not impossible in the light of the cases. If Con-
gress is careful to make the necessary fact findings and the draftsmen 
tailor the type of regulation imposed to fit the constitutional concepts 
discussed, it seems quite unlikely that the Court will substitute its ideas 
as to the necessity for such regulations for those reached by Congress. 
Actually, Congress might well provide for regulation under more 
than one of the powers suggested, as indicated earlier. An example of 
such a combination is the federal act giving to the Secretary of Interior, 
acting through the Bureau of Mines, power to investigate and inspect 
all coal mines whose operations "substantially affect commerce."94 The 
spending power justified the administrative expenses even before man-
datory inspections were authorized and the commerce clause justified 
the grant of power to compel mine operators to allow federal inspectors 
to check on health and safety conditions. 95 
These conclusions as to what the Supreme Court would do are, 
of course, in no way meant to indicate what Congress should enact as 
a matter of policy separated from the constitutional problems. 
93 See cases collected note 7 supra. . 
94 55 Stat. L. 177 (1941), 30 U.S.C. (1946) §4f, now, as substantially amended, 30 
U.S.C.A. (1952 Supp.) §451 et seq. 
95 The additions made in 1952, 66 Stat. L. 710, 30 U.S.C.A. (1952 Supp.) §451 
et seq., make an interesting study in cooperation between federal and state regulatory 
authorities. 
